CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background to the
Study
Nigeria is a large multi-ethnic country where
intra-ethnic cleavages remain a critical problem and ethnic militancy has
erupted periodically. Ethnic militancy in Nigeria have its roots in ethnic violence
which included: Ife-Modakeke Crisis in Osun State in 1834; Yoruba-Hausa Clashes
in Sagamu in 1999, Ogun State; Eleme-Okrika Conflict in Rivers State in 2012;
Zango-Kataf in Kaduna State in 1992; Tiv-Jukun in Wukari, Taraba State in 1989; Ogoni-Adoni in 1993-1994
in Rivers State; Chamba-Kuteb in Taraba State in 1991; Itsekiri-Ijaw/Urhobo in Delta State in 1997;
Aguleri-Umuleri in Anambra State in 1995; Ijaw-Ilaje conflict in Ondo State in 1998; Basa-Egbura
in Nassarawa State in 1998; Hausa/Fulani-Sawaya in Bauchi in 1948, 1959, 1977, 1991, 1995, 2001, 2005, 2010, 2011 and
2012 among others. These conflicts
have provided a pattern that makes scholars to attribute their causes to greed,
power and wealth distribution (Akinyele, 2003).
By 1999, various groups felt marginalised and formed
militia bodies that fought along ethnic lines.The Odua People’s Congress (OPC)
was put in place by the Yoruba in the south-western part of the country to
fight for the protection and defence of Yoruba in Nigeria.
In the eastern part was the Movement for the
Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), fighting for secession
of the Igbo ethnic tribe from the Nigeria.
In the north, the Arewa Peoples’ Congress was
formed to defend the northerners and propagate Sharia law across the northern
states. In the end, Nigeria became a hot-bet of militancy which challenged
established national security of the country (Albert, 2004). Thousands of militants, grouped under
different names such as The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
(MEND), the Ijaw Youth Council (lYC) and Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni
People (MOSOP), and recently Niger Delta Avengers, etc, have over the years
carried out multiple attacks on strategic oil and gas installations in the
Niger Delta region. Niger Delta transverses nine of the thirty six states of
Nigeria, namely: Abia, AkwaIbom, Bayelsa, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers
(Obi, 2005). Most of the oil exploration so far had been at the core Niger
Delta states of Beyelsa, Delta and Rivers. These three states had witnessed the
major crises in the region. Thus, Warri city has one of the highest rate of
militant attacks in Delta State due to the refinery and pipelines in the city (Imobighe,
2002).
Patterns
of militant attacks on oil installations, hostage taking and direct
confrontations with Nigerian security agencies have drawn both local and
international attention to their deplorable situation through their
restiveness.
The
Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), founded by Alhaji Mujahid Asari-Dokubo,
and the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), created by Ateke Tom, led more than 100
other smaller armed groups to violently engage the Federal Government and
multinational oil companies in a ‘war of attrition’(Ojakorotu & Olawale,
2009).
Asari’s
NDPVF launched a series of attacks on oil wells and installations, disrupting
oil production. The militant groups also attempted to control oil resources
through oil bunkering, an exercise that involves tapping pipelines. All of
these have had damaging effects on oil production in the region and eventually
led to shutting down of the Warri refineries several times (Akpabio & Akpan,
2010).
Clearly,
no militant group has ever emerged in a vacuum; there are dynamic contexts—political, social,
economic, temporal, spatial,
even religious—that must be taken into account. Thus, a considerable
amount of emphasis is placed on identifying the array of environmental
conditions and grievances among members of the local population that
facilitated opportunities for internal militancy in Nigeria to muster support
and orchestrate acts of political violence. The government of Nigeria has
struggled to deal effectively with these grievances and sources of tension
throughout the country, and there is a pervasive belief particularly among
northern Nigerians that the government continually fails to address critical
needs of those who aspire for a better future.
While
resources are surely constrained, it is the inequitable distribution of those
resources, and the widely acknowledged levels of corruption among elites, that
detract government’s effectiveness. In turn, patronage and corruption fuels a
general perception that government officials (to include law enforcement)
cannot be trusted, and this further undermines the government’s ability to
influence the behavior of local community members in positive directions, away
from the lure of radical extremist ideologies like that of Boko Haram (Jega,
2002).
There is
no universally agreed definition of militancy. At best, we have a “most
universally accepted” definition of militancy, which is the following:
militancy is the use of violence to create fear (i.e., terror, psychic fear)
for (1) political, (2) religious, or (3) ideological reasons (ideologies are
systems of belief derived from worldviews that frame human social and political
conditions). The terror is intentionally aimed at noncombatant targets (i.e.,
civilians or iconic symbols), and the objective is to achieve the greatest attainable
publicity for a group, cause, or individual. The meaning of militancy is
socially constructed (Barnett, & Amy, 2009).
Militancy
is different from murder, assault, arson, demolition of property, or the threat
of the same; the reason is that the impact of militant violence and damage
reaches more than the immediate target victims (e.g., government or military).
It is
also directed at targets consisting of a larger spectrum of society (e.g.,
civilians or even society as a whole). Militancy is distinct from regular crime
because of its powerful objectives. The change is desired so desperately that
the inability to achieve change is perceived as a worse consequence than the
deaths of civilians. Militant acts are both mala
prohibita acts and mala in se acts. Mala
prohibita acts are “crimes that are made illegal by legislation”; mala in
se acts are crimes “that are immoral or wrong in themselves.” (Peter &
Bruce, 2006).
On the
contrary, a militant is a person who believes in armed aggression for a societal
liberation. However, patterns of attacks carried out by Niger Delta militants
have made them to be labelled as militants. For instance, On October 1, 2010,
two vehicle-improvised explosive devices were detonated near Abuja’s Eagle
Square, venue of the parade, marking the country’s 50th anniversary of
independence (BBC, 2010). While the
ceremonies were in progress, MEND gave a notice of intent through an emailed
threat that bombs were to be detonated in clearly identified spots and time. It
warned all “invited guests, dignitaries and attendees [that] "several
explosive devices have been successfully planted in and around the venue by our
operatives working inside the government security services…In evacuating the
area, keep a safe distance from vehicles and trash bins” (Sahara Reporters,
2010).
After
about an hour after the threat, vehicle borne improvised explosive devices were
detonated causing substantial damage and fatal casualties. 12 people were
confirmed dead and 17 injured in the blasts (Reuters, 2010). The very idea of
the bomb blasts at all rather than the number of fatal casualties (though
both), were meant to send a message that the militants have the full capacity
to launch militant attacks outside of the creeks.
With
well trained fighters and equipped with sophisticated weaponry, it boasts a
membership that is well over 5, 0000 fighters (CNN, 11 December, 2008). Over
time, their tactics have evolved from crude kidnapping-for-ransom operations
into more sophisticated and effective methods that combine hostage-taking and
bombings (National Consortium for the Study of Militancy and Responses to
Militancy (START), 2008). Indeed, the
Niger Delta Technical Committee Report acknowledged that the “militants have
grown from rag-tag opportunistic group into very well-armed and well organised
combat forces” (Report of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta, 2008).
The
kidnapping of four foreign oil workers from a Shell flow station in Bayelsa on
January 11, 2006 brought its existence into national and international
consciousness.
On 19th
April, 2006, a military barracks in Port Harcourt, witnessed a car bomb
explosion where two people were killed and six seriously injured. On 29 April,
2006, MEND claimed responsibility for another bomb explosion that destroyed fuel
tankers and other properties at Effurun, the outskirts of Warri, Delta State.
Thus, inferences from these attacks shaped the choice of topic on internal
militancy rather than just internal militancy. As such, the study is aimed at
assessing the impact of ethnic militancy on Nigeria's national security.
1.2 Statement
of the Problem
Ethnic
militancy has a long history in Nigeria. Both the southern and northern parts
of the country have experienced acts of militancy or in some cases terrorism. Some of the groups that posed the greatest
challenge to Nigeria’s security between 1999 and 2015 include Movement for
Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), Oodua People’s Congress (OPC), Bakassi
Boys, Boko Haram, among others. These
groups adopted various strategies which included arson, kidnapping,
extra-judicial killings, looting,
unlawful detention,
disappearances, and at worst, suicide bombing.
While
some of these groups receive considerable support from the local people, the
fact is that their tactics sometimes constitute terrorism and pose a special
challenge to the Nigerian military.
Since the
return to civil
rule in 1999,
Nigeria has been
battling with series
of violent agitations from various
geo-political zones in the country. These violent agitations which have
taken terror dimensions
have contributed to
national security threat
that is capable
of disintegrating the country.
Terrorists’ attacks have
resulted in the killings
of over 30,000 people and
displaced 2.3 million people (Jonathan, 2004).
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